Media / subscription · 2011–2013Netflix: the Qwikster split and price shock (2011)
- Situation
- In 2011 Netflix separated its DVD-by-mail and streaming plans, which in effect raised prices by around 60% for customers who wanted both. It then announced it would spin the DVD business out under a new brand, Qwikster, with a separate website and account.
- Symptoms
- a wave of customer cancellations; a sharp fall in the share price; public criticism of the communication; confusion about two separate accounts and queues.
- Diagnosis
- The strategic direction was right, because streaming was the future and DVD-by-mail was a declining, costly business. The execution, however, pushed the cost of the transition onto loyal customers all at once, with little explanation and a worse experience.
- Prescription
- Within weeks Netflix dropped Qwikster and kept one website and brand. It kept the separate pricing but refocused on streaming content and, later, original programming.
- Outcome
- Netflix lost roughly 800,000 US subscribers in one quarter, and its share price fell by more than three-quarters from its peak. Subscriber growth recovered from 2012, and *House of Cards* (2013) marked the move into original content.
- Lessons
- Cannibalising your own legacy business early is often right, but sequence the change so that customers do not pay for it all at once. Price changes and structural changes should not land in the same announcement. Reverse a clear mistake quickly.
- Sources
- Reed Hastings and Erin Meyer, No Rules Rules (2020); Netflix shareholder letters, 2011–2012; contemporaneous coverage in The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal
Disruptive Innovation Behavioural Economics in Pricing Value-Based Pricing Leading Change
Retail / home entertainment · 2000–2010Blockbuster: dominance undone by its own business model (2000–2010)
- Situation
- Blockbuster ran thousands of video rental stores worldwide. Late fees were a material share of its revenue. In 2000 it reportedly declined an opportunity to acquire Netflix, then a small DVD-by-mail start-up.
- Symptoms
- customers resented late fees; a mail-order rival was growing among heavy renters; store traffic was flat to declining; the company carried significant debt.
- Diagnosis
- Blockbuster's profit model depended on things customers disliked (late fees, store visits). A disruptor serving those customers better was dismissed because it looked small and its margins looked unattractive. When Blockbuster did respond, with Blockbuster Online and the end of late fees in 2004–05, the response was squeezed by a costly store base and by activist investors pressing for short-term profit.
- Prescription
- Blockbuster should have built a separate, protected unit for the new model early, and been willing to cannibalise late-fee revenue and shrink the store estate deliberately.
- Outcome
- Blockbuster filed for bankruptcy in 2010. Its remaining assets were sold to DISH Network in 2011.
- Lessons
- If your profits rely on customer pain, a competitor will remove that pain. Respond to disruption while you still have cash, and give the new model its own space and its own measures of success.
- Sources
- Clayton Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma (1997) for the underlying theory; Gina Keating, Netflixed (2012); Blockbuster 10-K filings, 2004–2010
Disruptive Innovation Jobs to Be Done Unit Economics Corporate Turnaround
Imaging / consumer products · 1975–2012Kodak: inventing the digital camera and losing the digital era (1975–2012)
- Situation
- A Kodak engineer, Steven Sasson, built an early digital camera prototype in 1975. Kodak's profits, however, came mostly from film, chemicals and photo paper, a high-margin "razor and blade" model.
- Symptoms
- film volumes peaked around 2000 and then fell steeply; Kodak's digital cameras sold but earned thin margins; smartphones made dedicated cameras unnecessary for most people.
- Diagnosis
- Kodak did not lack technology. It was unwilling to give up film margins, and it misread the job customers wanted done. Digital moved the value from printing photographs to capturing and sharing them, and Kodak's capabilities were in chemistry, not software and networks.
- Prescription
- Kodak needed to redefine its business around images rather than film, invest in sharing platforms and software, and reallocate capital earlier, as Fujifilm did.
- Outcome
- Kodak filed for Chapter 11 in 2012 and emerged in 2013 as a much smaller commercial-imaging company.
- Lessons
- Ask which customer job your profits come from, not which product they come from. Protecting the margins of a legacy business is the most expensive form of denial.
- Sources
- Clayton Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma (1997); Willy Shih, "The Real Lessons from Kodak's Decline," MIT Sloan Management Review (2016); Kodak annual reports
Disruptive Innovation Jobs to Be Done Core Competence and Profit from the Core Dynamic Capabilities
Imaging / chemicals / healthcare · 2000–2015Fujifilm: surviving the end of film by redeploying core competences (2000–2015)
- Situation
- Fujifilm faced the same collapse of colour film demand as Kodak. Under CEO Shigetaka Komori it audited its technologies, including chemistry, thin films, collagen and anti-oxidation, against new markets.
- Symptoms
- core revenue was shrinking fast; large factories were becoming idle; the brand was tied to a disappearing product.
- Diagnosis
- Fujifilm's real assets were its capabilities in materials science, not its product category. Those capabilities could be applied in other industries.
- Prescription
- Fujifilm restructured and cut film capacity aggressively. It moved into LCD optical films, healthcare and medical imaging, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, financing the moves through acquisitions and R&D.
- Outcome
- Fujifilm became a diversified company in which healthcare and materials replaced most of the lost film profits. It remained profitable while Kodak went bankrupt.
- Lessons
- Define your company by what it can do, not by what it sells. Diversification works when it builds on genuine core competences, and it needs decisive capacity cuts in the declining business.
- Sources
- Shigetaka Komori, Innovating Out of Crisis (2015); Fujifilm Holdings annual reports; The Economist, "The last Kodak moment?" (2012)
Core Competence and Profit from the Core Ansoff Growth Matrix Dynamic Capabilities Corporate Turnaround
Telecoms hardware · 2007–2013Nokia: from global leader to exit in mobile phones (2007–2013)
- Situation
- In 2007 Nokia was the world's largest maker of mobile phones by a wide margin. The iPhone (2007) and Android (2008) moved competition from hardware to software, apps and ecosystems.
- Symptoms
- the Symbian platform was hard for developers to work with; projects were repeatedly delayed; market share fell sharply in high-end smartphones; internal teams fought over platforms.
- Diagnosis
- Researchers describe an organisational fear that made middle managers reluctant to report bad news and senior leaders over-optimistic. That culture combined with a hardware-centric identity in a market that had become an ecosystem and platform contest.
- Prescription
- In 2011 Nokia adopted Windows Phone as its primary platform. In hindsight, it needed a faster platform decision much earlier, and leadership that encouraged honest reporting of problems.
- Outcome
- Microsoft acquired Nokia's devices business in a deal announced in 2013. Nokia refocused on network infrastructure.
- Lessons
- When the basis of competition moves to platforms, a product advantage can disappear within a few years. A culture of fear hides the signals that leaders most need to see.
- Sources
- Timo Vuori and Quy Huy, "Distributed Attention and Shared Emotions in the Innovation Process," Administrative Science Quarterly (2016); Risto Siilasmaa, Transforming Nokia (2018)
Platform Strategy Network Effects Leading Change Dynamic Capabilities
Semiconductors · 1984–1986Intel: exiting memory chips to bet on microprocessors (1985)
- Situation
- Intel was founded as a memory company. By the mid-1980s Japanese manufacturers were selling DRAM at prices Intel could not match, and the company was losing money.
- Symptoms
- falling prices and losses in memory; Intel's identity bound up with DRAM; production capacity gradually drifting toward microprocessors without any formal decision.
- Diagnosis
- Intel had hit a strategic inflection point. Memory had become a commodity in which Intel had no advantage, while microprocessors, driven by the IBM PC, offered a defensible position.
- Prescription
- Andy Grove and Gordon Moore asked what new management would do if they were replaced, and concluded that new management would leave memory. Intel exited DRAM, closed plants, cut staff and concentrated on microprocessors.
- Outcome
- Intel became the dominant supplier of PC microprocessors, and one of the most valuable technology companies, for the following two decades.
- Lessons
- Middle managers' capacity decisions often reveal the strategy before leadership acknowledges it. Imagining yourself as the incoming CEO can make it possible to abandon your company's founding identity.
- Sources
- Andrew Grove, Only the Paranoid Survive (1996); Robert Burgelman, Strategy Is Destiny (2002)
Portfolio Focus and Simplification Core Competence and Profit from the Core Porter's Five Forces Dynamic Capabilities
Consumer technology · 1997–2001Apple: cutting the product line to four (1997)
- Situation
- When Steve Jobs returned in 1997, Apple was losing money, had a confusing range of Macintosh models and other products, and was weeks away from running out of cash.
- Symptoms
- heavy losses; dozens of overlapping SKUs; bloated inventory; retailers and customers unsure which product to buy.
- Diagnosis
- A lack of focus spread scarce engineering and marketing resources thinly and made Apple's positioning unclear.
- Prescription
- Apple cut the range to a simple two-by-two grid (consumer or professional, desktop or portable) and stopped many projects, including Newton. It secured a $150 million investment and software commitment from Microsoft, cut inventory sharply under Tim Cook's operations leadership, and relaunched the brand with "Think Different".
- Outcome
- Apple returned to profit in fiscal 1998, and the iMac became a hit. The company's renewed focus created the base for the iPod (2001) and later products.
- Lessons
- In a cash crisis, focus means deciding what not to do. Simplifying the product line also simplifies operations and inventory.
- Sources
- Walter Isaacson, Steve Jobs (2011); Apple 10-K filings, 1997–1999; Leander Kahney, Tim Cook (2019)
Portfolio Focus and Simplification Corporate Turnaround Positioning Cash Conversion Cycle
Toys / consumer products · 2003–2008LEGO: from near-bankruptcy back to the brick (2003–2008)
- Situation
- After years of diversifying into theme parks, clothing, video games and many new themes, LEGO reported large losses in 2003–04 and was close to running out of cash.
- Symptoms
- a sharp rise in the number of unique components; poor supply-chain performance; most product lines unprofitable; a culture of innovation that was not disciplined by profit.
- Diagnosis
- LEGO had innovated beyond its core. Complexity costs and unfocused diversification had eroded the economics of the brick system.
- Prescription
- CEO Jørgen Vig Knudstorp first concentrated on survival: selling the theme parks, cutting the number of components, outsourcing and then re-insourcing parts of production, and refocusing on the core brick. LEGO then rebuilt innovation with clear guardrails and profitability targets, and brought adult fans into product development.
- Outcome
- LEGO returned to profit within about two years and grew strongly through the following decade, becoming one of the world's most profitable toy companies.
- Lessons
- Sequence a turnaround: survive, then focus, then grow. Innovation needs boundaries tied to the core system and to unit economics.
- Sources
- David Robertson, Brick by Brick (2013); IMD and Harvard Business School case studies on LEGO; LEGO Group annual reports
Corporate Turnaround Portfolio Focus and Simplification Core Competence and Profit from the Core Unit Economics
Food service / retail · 2007–2010Starbucks: Howard Schultz's return and the reset (2008)
- Situation
- After rapid store expansion, Starbucks' same-store traffic declined in 2007–08 just as the financial crisis began. Howard Schultz returned as CEO in January 2008.
- Symptoms
- falling customer traffic; the experience diluted by automation and expansion; cannibalisation between nearby stores; a falling share price.
- Diagnosis
- Growth for its own sake had eroded the differentiated experience that justified premium prices.
- Prescription
- Starbucks closed around 600 underperforming US stores (and several hundred more later), closed US stores for an afternoon to retrain baristas, cut costs, invested in the coffee itself and launched a loyalty and digital programme.
- Outcome
- Comparable sales and profitability recovered from 2009–10. Mobile ordering and payment later became a significant competitive advantage.
- Lessons
- Premium positioning has to be protected in daily operations. Closing stores can be a growth decision. Digital loyalty can deepen the relationship with customers.
- Sources
- Howard Schultz, Onward (2011); Starbucks 10-K filings, 2008–2010
Positioning Corporate Turnaround Generic Strategies and Strategic Trade-offs Unit Economics
Media / entertainment IP · 1996–2009Marvel: from bankruptcy to a studio built on intellectual property (1996–2009)
- Situation
- Marvel filed for bankruptcy in 1996 after over-expansion and debt-financed acquisitions, as the comics market collapsed. After the reorganisation it licensed its characters to film studios.
- Symptoms
- collapsing comic sales; heavy debt; a vast character catalogue earning little; studios keeping most of the economics of licensed films.
- Diagnosis
- Marvel's most valuable asset was its character IP, but licensing gave away control and most of the upside.
- Prescription
- In 2005 Marvel raised roughly $525 million of non-recourse debt secured on film rights to a set of characters, and began producing its own films. It planned an interconnected universe of films, starting with Iron Man (2008).
- Outcome
- Iron Man was a commercial success. Disney acquired Marvel in 2009 for about $4 billion, and the Marvel Cinematic Universe became one of the highest-grossing film franchises.
- Lessons
- Identify the asset that creates the value and move to capture it. Structured financing can unlock owned IP without diluting equity.
- Sources
- Sean Howe, Marvel Comics: The Untold Story (2012); Ben Fritz, The Big Picture (2018); Marvel Entertainment SEC filings
Resource-Based View and VRIO Core Competence and Profit from the Core Fundraising, Dilution and Control Platform Strategy
Enterprise technology · 1993–2002IBM: Lou Gerstner keeps the company together (1993–2002)
- Situation
- IBM reported very large losses in the early 1990s as the PC and client-server computing undercut its mainframe franchise. The prevailing plan was to break the company into independent units.
- Symptoms
- heavy losses; an inward-looking bureaucracy; falling mainframe prices; a fragmented customer experience.
- Diagnosis
- IBM's distinctive value was its ability to integrate technology for large customers, and a break-up would have destroyed it. The deeper problem was culture.
- Prescription
- Gerstner kept IBM whole, cut mainframe prices and costs, sold non-core assets, and rebuilt the company around services and integrated solutions (later e-business). He also reworked compensation and culture.
- Outcome
- IBM returned to profit and became a services-led company. IBM Global Services grew into its largest business.
- Lessons
- Before splitting a company up, ask what only the whole can do. Culture is not one part of the game; Gerstner later described it as the game itself.
- Sources
- Louis V. Gerstner Jr., Who Says Elephants Can't Dance? (2002); IBM annual reports, 1993–2002
Corporate Turnaround Core Competence and Profit from the Core Leading Change Value Chain
Software / cloud · 2014–2023Microsoft: from know-it-all to learn-it-all under Satya Nadella (2014–)
- Situation
- Microsoft had missed mobile, its Windows-centric strategy was losing relevance and its culture was described as siloed and combative. Satya Nadella became CEO in 2014.
- Symptoms
- a flat share price for a decade; the failed Nokia phone acquisition; internal rivalry between divisions; reluctance to support rival platforms.
- Diagnosis
- The company's identity was tied to Windows rather than to customers' needs, and its culture prevented collaboration and learning.
- Prescription
- Microsoft adopted a mobile-first, cloud-first strategy centred on Azure, moved Office to subscription and across platforms, partnered with competitors, wrote off the Nokia acquisition and promoted a "growth mindset" culture. It later made a major investment in OpenAI.
- Outcome
- Azure became one of the two largest cloud platforms, and Microsoft became one of the most valuable companies in the world.
- Lessons
- Change the identity before the strategy. Partnering with rivals can widen your market. Subscription and cloud models change the economics of a software company.
- Sources
- Satya Nadella, Hit Refresh (2017); Microsoft annual reports, 2014–2023
Leading Change Platform Strategy Co-opetition and Game Theory Dynamic Capabilities AI Transformation
Automotive manufacturing · 1950s–2000sToyota: the production system as a strategic weapon (1950s–)
- Situation
- Post-war Toyota had limited capital and small, varied demand, so it could not copy Detroit's mass production. Taiichi Ohno and others developed the Toyota Production System (TPS).
- Symptoms
- at the outset: scarce capital, high inventory costs and quality problems. Mass production would have needed scale Toyota did not have.
- Diagnosis
- Waste (muda), from overproduction, inventory, waiting, rework and more, was the biggest cost driver. Stopping problems at source was cheaper than inspecting them out later.
- Prescription
- Toyota introduced just-in-time production with kanban pull signals, jidoka (machines and workers stop the line when there is a defect), continuous improvement (kaizen) and standardised work.
- Outcome
- Toyota became one of the world's largest and most profitable carmakers, and "lean" spread across industries. Its 2009–10 recall crisis also showed what happens when growth outpaces the system's discipline.
- Lessons
- An operating system can be a lasting advantage that is hard to copy. Making problems visible is the starting point for improving them.
- Sources
- Taiichi Ohno, Toyota Production System (1978; English 1988); James Womack, Daniel Jones and Daniel Roos, The Machine That Changed the World (1990); Jeffrey Liker, The Toyota Way (2004)
Lean Production Theory of Constraints Value Chain System Dynamics
E-commerce / cloud · 2001–2015Amazon: the flywheel and the birth of AWS (2001–2015)
- Situation
- After the dot-com crash, Amazon was criticised for thin margins. Its leaders described a self-reinforcing growth loop, a flywheel, and separately turned their internal infrastructure capabilities into a business.
- Symptoms
- low margins; investor scepticism; heavy investment needs; internal teams slowed down by shared infrastructure.
- Diagnosis
- In Amazon's loop, lower prices brought more customers, more customers attracted more sellers and selection, and greater scale lowered costs, allowing lower prices again. Amazon's internal infrastructure capability was also valuable to other companies.
- Prescription
- Amazon reinvested in the loop with Marketplace (2000), Prime (2005) and fulfilment, and launched Amazon Web Services (S3 and EC2 in 2006).
- Outcome
- AWS became the market leader in cloud infrastructure and, from 2015 when Amazon began reporting it separately, generated much of Amazon's operating profit.
- Lessons
- Map your growth as a causal loop and invest at its constraint. Capabilities built for internal use can become products in their own right.
- Sources
- Jim Collins, Turning the Flywheel (2019); Brad Stone, The Everything Store (2013); Amazon shareholder letters, 1997–2015
The Flywheel Platform Strategy Network Effects System Dynamics Core Competence and Profit from the Core
Retail · 1983–presentCostco: a membership model that makes low margins pay (1983–)
- Situation
- Costco sells a limited range of products (roughly 4,000 SKUs, far fewer than a typical supermarket) at low markups to members who pay an annual fee.
- Symptoms
- not a crisis case, but the model answers a common CEO problem: how to compete on price without destroying profit.
- Diagnosis
- Membership fees are a large part of Costco's operating profit. Merchandise margins can therefore stay very low, which builds trust and drives volume and renewals.
- Prescription
- Costco keeps a policy of capped markups, a limited range that gives it buying power, its own Kirkland Signature brand, high wages that reduce staff turnover, and a treasure-hunt shopping experience.
- Outcome
- Costco has sustained membership renewal rates around 90% in the US and Canada and has grown steadily for decades.
- Lessons
- Separate how you earn profit from how you set prices. A limited range can give you buying power. Trust can be the product.
- Sources
- Costco 10-K filings; Harvard Business School case studies on Costco Wholesale
Unit Economics Generic Strategies and Strategic Trade-offs Value-Based Pricing The Flywheel
Airlines · 1971–2000sSouthwest Airlines: a low-cost activity system that rivals could not copy (1971–2000s)
- Situation
- Southwest started as a Texas airline offering short-haul, point-to-point flights at low fares in an industry dominated by hub-and-spoke carriers.
- Symptoms
- rivals' attempts to copy it, such as Continental Lite and other airlines-within-an-airline, failed.
- Diagnosis
- Southwest's advantage came from a tightly fitted system of activities that reinforced each other: a single aircraft type, quick turnarounds, secondary airports, no assigned seating at first, and a distinctive culture.
- Prescription
- Southwest made trade-offs, choosing what not to do (no hubs, no first class, no interline connections) to protect the fit between its activities.
- Outcome
- Southwest was profitable for decades in a notoriously unprofitable industry.
- Lessons
- Rivals can copy individual activities, but not a whole system. Strategy is about choosing what not to do.
- Sources
- Michael Porter, "What Is Strategy?," Harvard Business Review (1996); Jody Hoffer Gittell, The Southwest Airlines Way (2003)
Generic Strategies and Strategic Trade-offs Positioning Value Chain Porter's Five Forces
Fashion retail · 1990s–2010sZara: a fast, responsive supply chain as the strategy (1975–)
- Situation
- Zara, part of Inditex, designs, produces and distributes much of its clothing close to its headquarters in Spain, and restocks stores twice a week.
- Symptoms
- not a crisis case, but it addresses a common problem: fashion inventory that has to be marked down because demand is unpredictable.
- Diagnosis
- In fashion, the value lies in responding to demand rather than forecasting it. Speed and small batches reduce markdowns and unsold stock.
- Prescription
- Zara uses vertical integration for fashion-sensitive items, keeps spare capacity on purpose, produces in small initial batches and scales up best-sellers, feeds sales data from stores directly into design, and spends little on advertising.
- Outcome
- Inditex became the world's largest fashion retailer by sales, with markdowns lower than the industry norm.
- Lessons
- Speed can be worth more than unit-cost efficiency. Spare capacity can be a strategic choice rather than waste.
- Sources
- Kasra Ferdows, Michael Lewis and Jose Machuca, "Rapid-Fire Fulfillment," Harvard Business Review (2004); Inditex annual reports
Value Chain Lean Production Cash Conversion Cycle Theory of Constraints
PC hardware · 1990s–early 2000sDell: growth funded by a negative cash conversion cycle (1990s)
- Situation
- Dell sold PCs direct to customers and built each one to order, with very little inventory.
- Symptoms
- not a crisis case, but it answers the question of how to grow fast without outside capital.
- Diagnosis
- Dell collected payment from customers before it had to pay its suppliers, so its cash conversion cycle was negative. Every sale released cash instead of absorbing it.
- Prescription
- Dell combined a direct sales model, build-to-order production, very low inventory (measured in days), and payment terms with suppliers that were longer than its terms with customers.
- Outcome
- Dell became the world's leading PC maker for a period and grew with its own cash. Inventory risk also stayed low when component prices fell.
- Lessons
- Working capital is a strategic variable. Design the order-to-cash cycle so that growth generates cash.
- Sources
- Michael Dell, Direct from Dell (1999); Joan Magretta, "The Power of Virtual Integration," Harvard Business Review (1998); Dell 10-K filings
Cash Conversion Cycle Value Chain Unit Economics Lean Production
Connected fitness / hardware · 2020–2022Peloton: building capacity for pandemic demand (2020–2022)
- Situation
- Demand for Peloton's bikes and treadmills surged during pandemic lockdowns. The company invested heavily in capacity, including buying a manufacturer and planning a US factory, and in logistics.
- Symptoms
- long delivery backlogs, followed by excess inventory; a treadmill safety recall in 2021; falling demand after reopening; heavy cash burn.
- Diagnosis
- Peloton treated a temporary demand spike as a permanent change and committed fixed costs to capacity just before demand normalised.
- Prescription
- Peloton ended the co-founder's tenure as CEO, cut jobs, cancelled the factory, outsourced manufacturing and restructured towards subscription-first pricing. With hindsight, it should have used flexible capacity and scenario planning in 2020.
- Outcome
- Peloton reported large losses and multiple rounds of layoffs, and its share price fell by more than 90% from its peak.
- Lessons
- Stress-test demand forecasts against a scenario in which the shock reverses. Prefer variable to fixed costs when demand is uncertain.
- Sources
- Peloton 10-K filings, 2021–2023; contemporaneous coverage in The Wall Street Journal and Financial Times
System Dynamics Runway, Burn and Default-Alive Unit Economics Corporate Turnaround
Real estate / flexible office · 2018–2023WeWork: the failed IPO and the limits of the narrative (2019)
- Situation
- WeWork leased offices long-term and sublet them short-term. It was valued at about $47 billion privately and filed for an IPO in 2019.
- Symptoms
- losses growing as fast as revenue; billions of dollars in long-term lease obligations; governance concerns raised by the S-1 filing, including founder super-voting shares and related-party dealings.
- Diagnosis
- A real estate arbitrage business was being valued like a technology platform. Its unit economics were negative after fully loaded costs, and its governance did not constrain the founder.
- Prescription
- WeWork withdrew the IPO, replaced the founder as CEO, accepted a rescue package from SoftBank and cut costs. A later SPAC listing (2021) did not fix the economics.
- Outcome
- WeWork filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2023.
- Lessons
- Valuation follows unit economics, not narrative. Governance problems become valuation problems when the company goes public. Matching long-term liabilities with short-term revenue is fragile.
- Sources
- WeWork Form S-1 (2019); Eliot Brown and Maureen Farrell, The Cult of We (2021); Reeves Wiedeman, Billion Dollar Loser (2020)
Unit Economics Fundraising, Dilution and Control Runway, Burn and Default-Alive Positioning
Media / streaming · 2018–2020Quibi: $1.75 billion without product–market fit (2020)
- Situation
- Quibi raised about $1.75 billion to offer premium short-form video designed only for phones, launching in April 2020.
- Symptoms
- downloads well below targets; content could not at first be shared or watched on TV; launch coincided with lockdowns, when people were at home rather than commuting.
- Diagnosis
- Quibi built and funded at scale before validating the core assumption that people would pay for short premium videos on the move. It was competing against free alternatives such as YouTube and TikTok.
- Prescription
- Quibi should have tested the core assumption cheaply before committing capital, and stayed flexible on format and distribution.
- Outcome
- Quibi shut down about six months after launch and sold its content library to Roku.
- Lessons
- Abundant capital can hide the absence of product–market fit. Test the riskiest assumption first, and check what customers can already get for free.
- Sources
- Founders' public shutdown announcement (October 2020); coverage in The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, 2020
Lean Startup and Pivoting Jobs to Be Done Runway, Burn and Default-Alive Crossing the Chasm
Travel / marketplace · 2020Airbnb: cutting deep and refocusing during the pandemic (2020)
- Situation
- COVID-19 caused bookings to collapse in spring 2020, just as Airbnb was preparing to go public.
- Symptoms
- bookings fell sharply; there was a wave of cancellations and refunds; the company faced a liquidity crunch.
- Diagnosis
- Airbnb had expanded into many adjacent businesses. In a crisis, it needed to protect its core marketplace and its cash.
- Prescription
- Airbnb raised about $2 billion in debt and equity, laid off around a quarter of its staff with severance terms that were widely praised, paused non-core projects such as transport and hotels, and shifted towards local, long-stay and domestic travel.
- Outcome
- Bookings recovered faster than expected. Airbnb went public in December 2020 at a valuation above $100 billion on its first trading day, and became profitable with a leaner cost base.
- Lessons
- In a shock, secure liquidity first, then focus. How a company handles layoffs shapes its reputation and culture long afterwards.
- Sources
- Brian Chesky's memo to employees (May 2020); Airbnb Form S-1 (2020)
Runway, Burn and Default-Alive Portfolio Focus and Simplification Corporate Turnaround Network Effects
Software / SaaS · 2012–2014Slack: the internal tool that outgrew the game (2013–2014)
- Situation
- Stewart Butterfield's company Tiny Speck built an online game called Glitch, which failed. The team had also built a messaging tool for its own use.
- Symptoms
- too few players to sustain the game, with money still in the bank.
- Diagnosis
- The internal tool solved an urgent problem (team communication without email overload) better than any alternative, and it had natural network effects inside a company.
- Prescription
- The company shut down the game and returned money to investors where appropriate, then launched Slack. It grew bottom-up through teams and then expanded within organisations.
- Outcome
- Slack became one of the fastest-growing SaaS companies, went public in 2019 through a direct listing, and was acquired by Salesforce in 2021 for about $27.7 billion.
- Lessons
- Look for the valuable thing your team has already built. Pivot while you still have cash. Products that spread within teams grow through land-and-expand.
- Sources
- Slack Form S-1 (2019); Salesforce press release (2020)
Lean Startup and Pivoting Network Effects Crossing the Chasm Jobs to Be Done
Consumer internet · 2010–2012Instagram: cutting Burbn down to one feature (2010)
- Situation
- Kevin Systrom and Mike Krieger built Burbn, a location check-in app with many features. Usage data showed people used only one part of it heavily: photo sharing.
- Symptoms
- low overall engagement; a confusing product; one feature with outsized use.
- Diagnosis
- The product was trying to do too much. The value was concentrated in simple, fast, good-looking photo sharing on mobile.
- Prescription
- The founders removed almost everything except photos, filters, likes and comments, and launched as Instagram on iOS in October 2010.
- Outcome
- Instagram gained about a million users in roughly two months. Facebook acquired it in 2012 for about $1 billion.
- Lessons
- Let usage data show where the value is, then cut ruthlessly. Simple products spread faster.
- Sources
- Sarah Frier, No Filter (2020)
Lean Startup and Pivoting Jobs to Be Done Portfolio Focus and Simplification Network Effects
Consumer goods / coffee · 1986–2012Nespresso: a closed system with recurring revenue (1986–2012)
- Situation
- Nestlé developed a capsule coffee system that struggled for years in the office market before it was repositioned as a premium consumer brand with its own club and boutiques.
- Symptoms
- at first, slow adoption in offices and weak economics on machines.
- Diagnosis
- The profit lay in a high-margin, recurring stream of capsules, protected by patents and a controlled direct channel, not in the machines.
- Prescription
- Nespresso licensed machine manufacturing to partners, sold capsules directly through its club, online and in boutiques, and built a luxury brand and service experience.
- Outcome
- Nespresso became a multi-billion-franc business. After key patents expired around 2012, compatible capsules arrived and margins came under pressure, prompting the Vertuo system.
- Lessons
- A razor-and-blade model needs a controlled channel and protected consumables. Plan for patent expiry long before it happens.
- Sources
- Nestlé annual reports; Harvard Business School and IMD case studies on Nespresso
Value-Based Pricing Platform Strategy Positioning Resource-Based View and VRIO
Consumer beverages · 1985Coca-Cola: New Coke and the meaning of the brand (1985)
- Situation
- Losing share to Pepsi, and seeing blind taste tests favour a sweeter flavour, Coca-Cola replaced its original formula with New Coke in April 1985.
- Symptoms
- intense consumer backlash; protest calls and letters; a media storm.
- Diagnosis
- Taste tests measured sip preference, not the emotional and identity value of the brand. The company removed something customers felt they owned.
- Prescription
- Within about three months, Coca-Cola reintroduced the original formula as Coca-Cola Classic.
- Outcome
- Coca-Cola Classic regained its leading position, and sales recovered. New Coke was eventually discontinued.
- Lessons
- Research measures what you ask about, and may miss what customers value most. Brand equity can be worth more than product attributes. Fast reversal limits the damage.
- Sources
- Thomas Oliver, The Real Coke, the Real Story (1986); The Coca-Cola Company's own retrospective publications
Behavioural Economics in Pricing Positioning Jobs to Be Done Leading Change
Department store retail · 2011–2013J.C. Penney: abolishing sales and discounts (2012)
- Situation
- New CEO Ron Johnson, previously head of Apple's retail stores, replaced J.C. Penney's frequent promotions and coupons with everyday fair pricing and planned to redesign stores as collections of boutiques.
- Symptoms
- a sharp drop in sales and store traffic; core customers leaving; heavy losses.
- Diagnosis
- Penney's core customers valued the experience of hunting for deals as part of the purchase. The change was rolled out across the whole company without testing.
- Prescription
- Penney should have tested the new pricing in a small number of stores before rolling it out nationally. In the event, the board removed Johnson in 2013 and restored promotions.
- Outcome
- Annual revenue fell by about a quarter in 2012. The company never fully recovered and filed for bankruptcy in 2020.
- Lessons
- Pricing psychology matters as much as price level. Test changes to the business model before rolling them out. What worked for one customer base may not transfer to another.
- Sources
- J.C. Penney 10-K filings, 2012–2013; coverage in Bloomberg Businessweek and The Wall Street Journal, 2012–2013
Behavioural Economics in Pricing Lean Startup and Pivoting Leading Change Positioning
Automotive / EV · 2017–2018Tesla: "production hell" on the Model 3 ramp (2017–2018)
- Situation
- Tesla took several hundred thousand reservations for the Model 3 and aimed for very rapid volume production with a highly automated line.
- Symptoms
- production far below targets; bottlenecks in battery module assembly and the final line; a heavy cash burn; public concern about liquidity.
- Diagnosis
- Over-automation made early production fragile, and the constraint kept moving between process steps.
- Prescription
- Tesla removed some automation, added a temporary assembly line in a tent, worked intensively on each successive bottleneck and focused on reaching a weekly production target.
- Outcome
- Tesla reached about 5,000 Model 3s a week in mid-2018 and reported profitable quarters in the second half of 2018. Elon Musk later said publicly that excessive automation had been a mistake.
- Lessons
- Ramp new production with the simplest process that works, then automate. Manage the bottleneck, which will move.
- Sources
- Tesla quarterly shareholder letters, 2017–2018; contemporaneous coverage in Bloomberg and Reuters
Theory of Constraints Lean Production Runway, Burn and Default-Alive System Dynamics
Appliances / manufacturing · 2005–2020sHaier: dissolving the hierarchy into micro-enterprises (2005–)
- Situation
- Haier, a Chinese appliance maker, had grown large and bureaucratic. Under CEO Zhang Ruimin it restructured into thousands of small, self-managing micro-enterprises linked to customers through a model called rendanheyi.
- Symptoms
- slow decisions; distance between employees and users; middle management layers that added little value.
- Diagnosis
- Hierarchy shielded employees from customers and market signals. Accountability and rewards needed to follow the value each team created for users.
- Prescription
- Haier removed many middle-management roles, formed micro-enterprises with real profit-and-loss accountability and their own decision rights, set up internal markets and platforms, and linked pay to user value.
- Outcome
- Haier became the world's largest appliance maker by some measures, and acquired GE Appliances in 2016, applying the model there too.
- Lessons
- Organisational design can be a strategic choice. Push decisions and accountability close to the customer.
- Sources
- Gary Hamel and Michele Zanini, Humanocracy (2020); Bill Fischer, Umberto Lago and Fang Liu, Reinventing Giants (2013)
Leading Change Platform Strategy Dynamic Capabilities System Dynamics
Electronics / conglomerate · 1993–2000sSamsung: Lee Kun-hee's New Management declaration (1993)
- Situation
- In 1993 Samsung Chairman Lee Kun-hee concluded that the group was focused on volume and of mediocre quality. In Frankfurt he called for change across the group, a speech widely summarised as an instruction to change everything except one's wife and children.
- Symptoms
- quality problems; products seen as cheap imitations; a culture centred on volume.
- Diagnosis
- Competing on cost and volume against Japanese leaders was a dead end. Samsung needed to compete on quality, design and leadership in key technologies.
- Prescription
- Samsung refocused on quality, including a widely reported public destruction of defective phones in 1995. It invested heavily in memory semiconductors and displays, recruited global talent and built a design capability.
- Outcome
- Samsung became a world leader in memory chips, displays and smartphones.
- Lessons
- Shifting a company from volume to quality needs visible, symbolic action from the top. Concentrated, counter-cyclical investment in a few technologies can create global leadership.
- Sources
- Geoffrey Cain, Samsung Rising (2020); Tarun Khanna, Jaeyong Song and Kyungmook Lee, "The Paradox of Samsung's Rise," Harvard Business Review (2011)
Leading Change Core Competence and Profit from the Core Positioning Generic Strategies and Strategic Trade-offs
Food service / QSR · 2009–2015Domino's: admitting the pizza was bad (2009–2010)
- Situation
- Domino's product consistently ranked poorly in taste surveys. In late 2009 the company launched a reformulated pizza with advertising that openly acknowledged customer criticism.
- Symptoms
- poor taste rankings; flat sales; a brand associated with cheap, mediocre pizza.
- Diagnosis
- The core product was weak. Marketing and delivery speed could not make up for it.
- Prescription
- Domino's rebuilt the recipe, ran transparent advertising, and invested heavily in digital ordering and tracking (online ordering, the Pizza Tracker, mobile apps), positioning itself as a technology company that sells pizza.
- Outcome
- Same-store sales grew strongly in the years that followed, and digital became the majority of US sales. The share price rose many-fold over the following decade.
- Lessons
- Fix the product before amplifying it. Candour can rebuild trust. Investing in the digital channel can redefine a commodity category.
- Sources
- Domino's Pizza 10-K filings, 2009–2015; Harvard Business School case study on Domino's digital transformation
Corporate Turnaround Positioning AI Transformation Value Chain
Software · 2011–2015Adobe: moving Creative Suite to subscription (2012–2013)
- Situation
- Adobe sold Creative Suite as perpetual licences with upgrade cycles every 18–24 months. It announced Creative Cloud in 2012 and stopped selling new versions of Creative Suite in 2013.
- Symptoms
- lumpy revenue tied to release cycles; piracy; customers skipping upgrades; little ongoing relationship with users.
- Diagnosis
- The perpetual licence model captured value unevenly and limited Adobe's ability to ship updates continuously and build cloud services.
- Prescription
- Adobe switched to subscription-only. It explained the transition to investors in advance, with new metrics such as annualised recurring revenue, and accepted a temporary fall in revenue.
- Outcome
- Revenue and earnings dipped during the transition, then grew strongly, and recurring revenue became the large majority of the total. Adobe's market value rose many-fold over the decade.
- Lessons
- Business model transitions create a predictable earnings dip, so explain it to investors in advance and change the metrics you report. Subscription aligns value delivery with revenue.
- Sources
- Adobe Financial Analyst Meeting presentations (2011–2013); Adobe 10-K filings, 2012–2016; Harvard Business School case studies on Adobe's transition to the cloud
Value-Based Pricing Unit Economics Leading Change Disruptive Innovation